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The Past as a Problem of the Present:
Zen, the Kyoto School, and Nationalism
T a it e t s u  U n n o
The collection of articles in Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question o f  Nationalism, edited by John Maraldo and James Hei­sig (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1995), is a welcome addition to 
the growing, critical literature on Zen and the Kyoto school of philosophy. 
They expand our horizons for exploring a number of important issues, 
although only a few can be touched on here. They include wartime complicity 
of intellectuals, relationship between religio-philosophical thought and socio- 
historical realities, link between social criticism and self-critique, and false hu­
man constructs that need to be dissolved.
Since different assumptions about history are implicit in the articles by the 
contributors to Rude Awakenings, it may help us to see them according to 
Nietzsche’s view of history. His basic approach may be summed up in the fol­
lowing words:
Nietzsche couches his own philosophy in terms of a vast historical 
analysis; he deals with human history in order to place it in the ser­
vice of life. His early essay sets an agenda for his own philosophical
* This paper was presented at the summer institute on “ Imperial Japan 1895— 
1945,” August 3-15, 1997, sponsored by the Five College Center for East Asian Stu­
dies at Mt. Holyoke College. I wish to acknowledge the research support for this paper 
which I received in 1994 from the Japan Foundation, Kyoto University and the Nanzan 
Institute for Religion and Culture.
245
TH E E A ST E R N  B U D D H IST  X X X , 2
labors. And it is difficult to read his depiction of mankind as hori­
zon-creating without seeing here the first stirrings of the doctrine of 
the Will to Power.1
1 From the introduction by Werner Dannhauser to Chapter II on the use and abuse 
of history in Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen, translated as Unmodern Observations, ed. 
William Arrowsmith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 84.
2 For examples of defensive strategies dealing with Martin Luther’s anti-Semitism, 
see Tainted Greatness: Antisemitism and Culture Heroes, ed. Nancy Harrowitz 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 15-35. The volume includes chapters 
on Gerhard Kittel, Mircea Eliade, Carl Jung, Masud Khan, Cesare Lombroso, Wag­
ner, Heidegger, Ezra Pound, De Man, Jean Genet, and passing comments on Joseph 
Conrad, T. S. Eliot, Joseph Campbell and Louis-Ferdinand Celine. The final chapter 
by Joshua Cohen, “The Remembrance of Amalek: Tainted Greatness and the Bible,” 
sums up the relationship between taintedness and greatness: “To fight bigotry we must 
understand it, which we cannot do without first remembering that our ‘taintedness’ is 
indivisible from our ‘greatness.’ Let us, therefore, follow the example of the Talmudic 
sages, who wrestled with their tainted greatness for the blessings of moral illumina­
tion,” 300.
Two points are significant for our discussion: 1) historical studies should be 
pursued in the “ service of life” ; and 2) they should provide fertile ground for 
a new philosophy to cope with changing historical realities.
Relevant to Nietzsche’s observation, the objective, self-critical nature of 
some articles in Rude Awakenings give a balanced picture, contributing to 
serving life; and the complex variety and different conclusions of the 15 papers 
in this volume provide a fertile ground for future studies.2 Rather than simply 
classifying them into the self-evident categories of critics and apologists, 
accusers and defenders, or dismissing them simply as “ a clash of tempera­
ments,” they all merit serious considerations in accord with Nietzsche’s clas­
sification of history into monumental, antiquarian, and critical.
I
The first point regarding self-critique is exemplified by the observation made 
by John Maraldo, at the end of his well-crafted article on Nishitani, Abe and 
Suzuki, “ Questioning Nationalism Now and Then.” His reflection is a befit­
ting conclusion to the entire volume:
We also know from experience that one day our verdicts will likely 
meet with criticism. And yet this knowledge can free us to be open to 
continued questioning. If there is no end to the process of critique, it 
is not because a final judgment is perpetually deferred, but because 
the goal is so close at hand: always to remember that the past is a
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problem of the present. Critique of nationalism is ultimately a self­
critique.3
3 Rude Awakenings, 362.
4 Unzeitgemdsse Betrachtungen, translated as Unfashionable Observations by 
Richard C. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 96. Among the various 
English translations of this work, including Untimely Meditations, tr. J. R. Holling- 
dale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), the Gray version is closest to 
the German edition in Friedrich Nietzsche: Samtliche Werke, Kritische Studienaus- 
gabe, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin and New York: Walter de 
Gruyer & Co., 1995), 1:157-510. All subsequent references are to the Gray translation.
5 The full title is “Kindai no chokoku” ron—Showa seishinshi no ichidanso [Theo­
ries on “ Overcoming Modernity” : One perspective on Showa intellectual history] 
(Tokyo: Kodansha, 1989), 7-8. An example of changes in historical appraisal is the 
case of Subhas Chandra Bose, leader of the Indian independence movement, who op­
posed the tactics of Gandhi and Nehru. During World War II, he formed the Indian 
National Army, sided with the Japanese against the British, and was defeated in the Imp- 
hal campaign, the abortive attempt of the Japanese army to invade India via Burma. 
Bose died in 1945 and was harshly criticized as an Axis sympathizer, traitor, and fas­
cist. But on the 100th anniversary of his birth this year (1997), January 23 was declared 
a national holiday, honoring him as a patriot and hero. During the 50-year anniversary 
of Indian independence, symposia were held which proposed to reevaluate the role of 
Bose in modern Indian history. See the article by Nobuko Nagasaki of Tokyo Univer­
sity in Sobun (a publication of Sobunsha) No. 309 (July 1977), 1-5.
Whenever we criticize past thinkers, we must remember that they are of 
another age in a different political climate, facing their own unique problems 
which may be beyond our comprehension. In the words of Nietzsche, “ Mea­
suring past opinions and deeds according to the widespread opinions of the 
present moment is what those naive historians call ‘objectivity.’ It is in these 
that they discover the canon of all truth; their aim is to force the past to fit the 
mold of their fashionable triviality. By contrast, they call ‘subjective’ every 
form of historiography that refuses to accept these popular notions as canoni­
cal.” 4
In addition, our views in our own times may also shift with changing histori­
cal circumstances and personal interests. Hiromatsu Wataru, a critic of the 
Kyoto school, for example, notes in the most recent introduction to his “Kin- 
dai no chokoku” ron (Theories on “ Overcoming Modernity” ) that his views 
have changed over a 20-year period: when the chapters in the book were first 
serialized in a journal in 1974; when they were published in book form in 
1980; and when the revised, enlarged edition appeared in 1989. The latest ver­
sion appears, he writes, because “ In comparison to 1980 the subjects debated 
and the agenda pursued have become ‘an actuality’ in recent times.” 5
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Valid criticism in academia is most welcome, if it is constructive and placed 
in the proper context. James Heisig’s meticulous study of Tanabe summarizes 
five contemporary criticisms, ranging from the Marxist Tosaka Jun, a student 
of Nishida and a close friend of Nishitani, who died in prison in 1945, to a 
liberal historian, Ienaga Saburd, whose study of Tanabe is a model of in- 
depth scholarship. His approach includes self-critique from which he himself 
should not be excluded. In his words:
A conscientious appraisal of Tanabe, his critics, and the intellectual 
atmosphere in which each of them worked requires fuller detail on 
nearly every point. Further, such an appraisal must at least aim for 
the same critical self-awareness that it is predisposed to accuse 
Tanabe and others of the Kyoto school for having failed to achieve.6
6 Ibid., 285.
1 Japan in Traditional and Postmodern Perspective, eds. Charles Fu and Steven 
Heine (Albany: SUNY, 1995), 281. For a revealing, critical review of Faure’s essay, see 
Graham Parkes, “ The Putative Fascism of the Kyoto School and the Political Correct­
ness of the Modern Academy,” Philosophy East and West 4-T.3, 311-321.
8 Unfashionable Observations, p. 143.
A similar caution is sounded in another recent study, “ The Kyoto School and 
Reverse Orientalism,” by Bernard Faure. He concludes his article with the fol­
lowing words:
The recent interest in the philosophy of the Kyoto school in the West 
makes this ideological critique more urgent. However, rather than ac­
cusing or excusing individual authors, we should shift the focus to 
ourselves, and realize that our accusing and excusing, excluding or in­
cluding is never neutral, that our reading these texts, our receipt is al­
ways verging on deception.7
If Faure had taken his own advice more seriously and made it prefatory to his 
analysis, the possibility of self-delusion would have been even more attenuat­
ed than indicated by his article.
Self-critique is at the core of Nietzsche’s view of history which he saw as a 
form of delusion. The target of his criticism was the founder of objective histo­
ry, the “ celebrated historical virtuoso” Leopold von Ranke, as well as the 
philosopher Hegel, who believed that “ the apex and culmination of the world 
process coincided with his own existence in Berlin.” 8 For Nietzsche the histori­
cal process can never be completed; the end of history is a myth. Thus, any 
judgment reached by selecting from infinite possibilities can only be an inter­
pretation.
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That all history is subjective is Nietzsche’s observation which echoes the crit­
ical views of “ the underground man.” 9 His sweeping questioning of all exist­
ing values, whether ethical, philosophical, or religious is radical, resulting in 
his philosophy of perspectivism. He also applies this approach to history:
9 For the relationship between Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, see The Disappearance o f  
God: A  Divine Mystery by Richard Elliot Friedman (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 
1988), Chapter 7, “ Nietzsche at Turin.” I wish to thank Dennis Hudson for this refer­
ence.
10 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr. Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1968), 267 (No. 481).
11 Unfashionable Observations, 96. Gray notes that while Nietzsche considered his 
essay on history to be the weakest of the four essays in this volume, today it is consi­
dered to be the most significant. Ibid., 407.
In so far as the word “ knowledge” has any meaning, the world is 
knowable; but it is interpretable, otherwise it has no meaning behind 
it, but countless meanings. . . .  It is our needs that interpret the 
world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of 
lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel 
all the other drives to accept as a norm.10
Nietzsche’s overarching agenda of overcoming nihilism in Europe in the 19th 
century culminates in the questioning of the very possibility of any and all ob­
jective truths. But it is also within this project that he leaves room for the 
study of the past, provided that it contributes to enhancing the present and to 
serving life.
To that end Nietzsche examines three types of history in Chapter II of his 
Unfashionable Observations, entitled “ On the Utility and Liability of History 
for Life.” He writes:
History pertains to the living person in three respects: It pertains to 
him as one who acts and strives, as one who preserves and venerates, 
and one who suffers and is in need of liberation. The three relations 
correspond to three kinds of history: in so far as it is permissible to 
distinguish between a monumental, an antiquarian, and a critical 
kind of history.11
Monumental or exemplary history studies models of great achievements of 
humankind in the past. Antiquarian history discerns historical forces that con­
tribute to the present and to love of tradition. Critical history points out not 
only outdated aspects of the past but injustices that must be abolished. Each, 
however, when misused, contains a hidden danger. Monumental history may
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obstruct emergence of present greatness and produce nothing but epigoni, anti­
quarian history may praise aspects of the past which deserve to be censured, 
and critical history may uproot more of the past than should be uprooted.
In spite of the ambiguity of history, these three create the horizons of life. 
The horizons become enriched with the increase in perspectives, even if ab­
solute knowledge is impossible. In the past horizons may have been created 
unconsciously, but today we are in the position to consciously create them for 
unparalleled human accomplishments. For this the proper use of history is 
crucial. In the words of Nietzsche:
To be sure, we need history; but our need for it is different from that 
of the pampered idler in the garden of knowledge. . . . We need it 
for life and for action, not for the easy withdrawal from life and 
from action, let alone whitewashing a selfish life and cowardly, base 
actions.
And he continues, sending a warning to current academic enterprises:
We only wish to serve history to the extent it serves life, but there is a 
way of practicing history and a valorization of history in which life 
atrophies and degenerates: a phenomenon that it will likely be as 
painful as it is necessary to diagnose in the striking symptoms of our 
present age.12
All the articles in Rude Awakenings contribute to the creation of new 
horizons in diverse ways: the focus on the question of nationalism (critical), 
detailed background information on events clouded by the passage of time (an­
tiquarian) and the possible contributions to enhancing the present and serving 
life (monumental). Some papers contain more than one of these attributes, 
but none contains all three. One glaring lacuna is the feminist perspective on 
history.
Apropos the title, Rude Awakenings, many articles focus on the complicity 
of Zen and the Kyoto school with Japanese imperialism. But, to quote 
Nietzsche, critical history should be undertaken, in the “ service for life,” not 
simply out of ressentiment. The errors committed in the past must be brought 
to light, but “ the knowledge of the past is at all times desirable only insofar as 
it serves the future and the present—not insofar as it weakens the present or 
uproots a future that is full of life.” 13 While we must not hesitate “ to shatter 
and dissolve the past . . .  by bringing the past before a tribunal, painstakingly 
interrogating it, and finally condemning it,” 14 we must go beyond mere name-
12 Ibid., 85.
13 Ibid., 108.
14 Ibid., 106.
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calling. “ People call names when they run out of ideas or are too lazy to do 
the hard work. Being seriously critical is hard work.” 15
15 “ Whither Civility?” by Courtney Leatherman, The Chronicle o f  Higher Educa­
tion, March 8, 1996, A21-22.
16 The Cambridge History o f Japan, ed. Peter Duus (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, 1993), 6:741. See also Parkes’ review cited in fn. 7.
17 Rude Awakenings, 107.
18 Ibid., 171.
19 Oketani quoted by Horio, ibid., 302.
20 Rude Awakenings, p. 130. Nishida Kitaro Zenshu (nkz) [Collected Works of 
Nishida] (Iwanami, 1978), 12: 415.
II
The diversity of views on Nishida and the Kyoto school range from the judg­
ment of Tetsuo Najita and Harry Harootunian that they fashioned the 
“ philosophical contours of Japanese fascism” 16 to Michiko Yusa’s statement 
in her article: “ Nishida’s systematic philosophy was far too universal in scope 
to submit to the petty racial egoism, cultural chauvinism, and pseudo­
religious belief in the superiority of the Japanese people that was the hallmark 
of nationalism—or rather ultranationalism—prevalent at that time.” 17
I believe that both views are one-sided and fail to acknowledge the volatile 
nature of historical vicissitudes. This fact would lead us to see Nishida in a 
more complex light, similar to Andrew Feenberg’s observation: “ Nishida’s 
earlier political writings had followed conventional opinion in over-estimating 
the philosophical significance of the state, a natural enough tendency given tire 
centrality of the state in reshaping Japan from the Meiji period on. However, 
this state naturally had proven a false path, and Nishida’s attempt to infuse it 
with his own culturalism was a disastrous failure, as he would no doubt have 
conceded had he survived the war.” 18 In a sense Nishida is a tragic figure, 
caught up in the vortex of his times. Oketani Hideaki describes his case aptly 
as “ ideas overcome by events, prophecies stumbling into endorsements.” 19
Yet Nishida is not completely free of the taint of nationalism, for he does 
sound like a spokesperson for the Imperial Way. A case in point is his famous 
pronouncement on national polity (kokutai), cited by various authors. In 
Yusa’s rendition it reads:
The Japanese kokutai captures the essence of the idea of kokutai as 
that which makes up the historical world; what the Japanese people 
think of when they hear the word has no counterpart in any foreign 
language.20
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Later he defines the unique role of the national polity of Japan:
It is only in virtue of the fact that the Japanese national polity, as the 
creative modality of the formation of the historical world, contains a 
principle of the world from which a principle of the formation of an 
East Asian world can emerge. This is how we need to think of hakko 
iu (translation slightly revised).21
21 Ibid., 127. NKZ 12: 419.
22 Ibid., 178.
23 See Atsuko Hirai’s critical review of Carol Gluck’s Japan’s Modern Myth (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1985) in The Journal o f Asian Studies 46:1 (February 
1987), 89-103.
24 Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1992), 9. The work undertakes a comparative treatment of nationalism in English, 
France, Germany, Russia and the United States of America.
The last phrase, rendered “ All the world under one roof,” epitomizes 
Nishida’s position concerning the central role of the Emperor of Japan in 
world history. How are we to understand such a statement?
Nishida’s pronouncements come from the era of nation-building when 
Japan began its modernization in 1868. Kevin Doak identifies a crucial factor 
in this process as follows: “ No clear distinction between a sense of nation root­
ed in the emerging nation-state and a sense of nation rooted in the people as 
an autonomous source of racial identity, separate and distinct from the state, 
emerged at this time.” 22 This is borne out in the confusion found in the 
Japanese translations of “ nation” as kokka (country), kokumin (citizen), min- 
zoku (race) and minshu (people). Sometimes they are used interchangeably, 
and even scholars of Japanese history have been careless in their in­
discriminate usage.23 24 More importantly, the confusion reveals something 
about the nature of Japanese nationalism that is prone to totalitarianism and 
fascism.
As Liah Greenfeld points out in Nationalism: Five Roads to ModernityN  
nationalism is a modern construct born in response to structural contradic­
tions in the modernization process. Her study of nationalism growing out of 
this dysfunction in England, France, Germany, Russia, and the U.S. is helpful 
in assessing the rapid modernization of Japan as a nation-state, including the 
price it paid. In sum:
Once adopted, nationalism accelerated the process of change, chan­
neled it into a certain direction, limited the possibilities of future 
development, and became a major factor in it. It thus both ac-
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knowledged and accomplished the grand social transformation from 
the old order to modernity.25
The sense of unity essential to modernization forged the myth of the nation­
state. As “ an imagined political community,” 26 a historical construct, any 
pronouncements coming from it would be necessarily ideological.
Historically, “ nation” originally referred to groups of foreigners who came 
to study at medieval universities in Europe, then it changed into a community 
of opinion and by extension an intellectual elite. In 17th-century England na­
tion referred to the people and later the sovereignty of people. Parallel with 
this existed the aristocracy in Europe who were interrelated through marriage 
and the intellectual class which was cosmopolitan. Both of these phenomena 
were non-existent in Japan.27
Inherent in nationalism is the belief in a chosen people which is but one step 
away from military aggression.28 The notion of a chosen people is directly con­
nected to the emperor-centered myth in the case of Japan—“ the sovereign em­
bodying in himself absolute value.” Although Maruyama Masao’s thesis may
25 Ibid., 487.
26 For helpful references to nationalism, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Commu­
nities (Landon: Verso, 1983). Also, Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1976). I am indebted to Richard Minear for these sources. 
See also, Daedalus 122:3 (Summer 1993), Special Issue on Reconstructing Nations and 
States.
27 This point is important for considering political asylum in a foreign country 
which was not an option for the Japanese, adding to its isolation and provincialism. 
Paul Tillich makes an interesting point about the provincialism of German academia 
which he realized only after he came to the U.S. See his Theology o f  Culture (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1958), Chapter XII.
28 This belief in a chosen people appeared in different guises. Greenfeld notes, for ex­
ample, England: “ God is English” and “ God and his angels fought on her side against 
her foreign foes,” 60. France: nation is the incarnation of the sacred, for “ The Nation 
exists before everything, it is the source of everything,” 172. Russia: nation born from 
ressentiment relative to the West: “ First, that everything is awful with us, while in for­
eign lands everything is good; the second, that in foreign lands everything is awful, and 
with us everything is good,” 233. Germany: “The German alone can be a patriot; 
he alone can for the sake of his nation encompass the whole of mankind; contrasted 
with him from now on the patriotism of every other nation must be egoistic, narrow 
and hostile to the rest of mankind,” 276, quoting Fichte. U.S.A.: “ The different 
peoples are to be considered as component parts, prepared, like so many springs and 
wheels, one day to be put together. . . .  In this great work our country holds the noblest 
rank. . . . Our country stands, therefore, more than any other, as the realization of the unity 
of the race,” 398, quoting Bancroft.
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be taken as another form of Japanese particularism, his main point is well 
taken: while European nationalism was born from the people and the mecha­
nism of rule was a value-neutral institution, in Japan the nation was imposed 
from above and the locus of morality was the state and the emperor.29 This na­
tion-building from above was made possible by the bureaucracy, impacted by 
the /zan-feudal order, with the Emperor as the sole source of all conceivable 
virtues. The people did not count, other than being subjects of imperial rule.
29 Maruyama, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, ed. Ivan Morris 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), Chapter I, “Theory and Psychology of 
Ultra-nationalism,” 1-24.
30 Quotation is from a new translation of Maruyama’s “Theory and Psychology of 
Ultra-nationalism” by Richard Minear. Unpublished typescript, p. 4.
31 Rude Awakenings, 87-90.
32 Ibid, 123-125.
33 See, for example, Nakamura Yujiro Chosaku-shil [Collected Works of Nakamura 
Yujiro] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993) 7: 350-357.
Japanese nationalism accelerated the adoption of Western technology, in­
dustry and military power but not the ideas of individualism and liberal 
democracy. In political terms, “ Where the state order is not conscious of its 
own formal nature, it is impossible by the very nature of things for any private 
realm to exist that is not captive to this state order.” 30 The kokutai was a 
powerful moral and material force that could crush any and all forms of oppo­
sition.
It is in such a world that the philosophers connected with the prestigious 
Kyoto Imperial University were called upon to become spokespersons on be­
half of the state (Nishida had retired from the faculty in 1928). To take just 
one prime example, Nishida was asked by the Tojo government in May, 1943, 
to write an essay, “ The Principles of a New World Order.” It would be used 
to unify and mobilize the Asians under Japanese occupation. Ueda Shizuteru 
summarizes its main points in his comprehensive treatment of Nishida’s 
thought,31 and Yusa also gives details on its drafting.32 But, as Nakamura 
Yujiro has shown, the event was not so straightforward.33 Nishida initially 
refused to cooperate, but later acceded and several people had a hand in draft­
ing the statement. Nishida was suspicious of the Army’s intentions and was 
cautious about supporting the war. In fact, he avoided using nationalistic jar­
gon, such as Greater East Asia, sacred war, and Anglo-American imperialism. 
In the announced text, however, these terms appear as if they were Nishida’s 
own words.
When Nishida realized soon thereafter that the events occurring were be­
yond his control and seeing his inability to change the course of history, he be­
gan to rethink the implications of kokutai. It would be central to a global
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world that would be realized by the people of a specific nation, whereby the 
creative contributions of the people would be recognized. Furthermore, a vari­
ety of regional traditions with their own kokutai would be promoted which 
would constitute the new world order. Thus, toward the end of his life Nishida 
articulated an entirely different understanding of kokutai. As noted by Au­
gustin Jacinto Z.:
In this process the Imperial Throne would stand at the center, but 
with the proviso that the kokutai be defined in terms of self-nega­
tion, and that this self-negation be extended to include the plurality 
of other kokutai or states no less conscious of their historical mis­
sion.34
34 Rude Awakenings, 148.
35 In contrast, Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazi regime was more explicit and 
concrete. For comparison of Heidegger and Nishida, see comments by Feenberg in 
Rude Awakenings, 168-170, and Maraldo in The Eastern Buddhist, N.S., 28:2, 189-90, 
See also comparisons by Joseph Grange and Allan Plaskow in Philosophy East and 
West 41:4, 515-527.
36 Rude Awakenings, 229.
37 For a parallel affirmation of conflicting views, see Rabbi Joseph Polak’s conclud­
ing remark in his Afterword in Tainted Greatness: “This volume of essays has attempt­
ed to raise some important questions regarding some of our cultural heroes and the 
legacy they have left us. Foremost among these, in my mind, and perhaps the begin­
ning of the synthesis is the question raised to me by Elie Wiesel, namely, not what to do 
with the taint of these heroes but what to do with their greatness,” 305.
But this was too abstract and too idealistic,35 as pointed out by many critics, 
some of the sharpest being his own former students: Miki Kiyoshi, Mutai 
Risaku, Tosaka Jun, Yanagida Kenjuro, and others. Yet the philosophical 
grounding of this view, the logic of basho or place, would be inherited by his 
successors in the Kyoto school.
Ill
Minamoto Ryoen, in his article, “ The Symposium on ‘Overcoming Moderni­
ty’,” clearly states that “ Nishitani was a nationalist and that he supported the 
war.” 36 This would confirm Jan Van Bragt’s conclusion that the Kyoto school 
is inherently nationalistic. But Minamoto also shows that Nishitani was an ad­
vocate of “ world ethic,” going beyond national egos to overcome the prob­
lems of modernity. How these two contrasting positions are reconciled is not 
addressed, but the recourse to Nietzsche’s three kinds of history leaves open 
the possibility of affirming both positions.37
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The Symposium on ‘Overcoming Modernity’ and the concurrent event, de­
scribed by Horio Tsutomu in “ The Chuokoron Discussions: Their Back­
ground and Meaning,” both dealt with historical problems that the Japanese 
experienced in its rapid modernization. In 1942 the agenda was twofold: first, 
going beyond modernity with its historical roots in the West, manifested in 
imperialism, capitalism, scientific technology, and Marxist ideology; and sec­
ond, articulating the future vision of Japan that embraced Western technolo­
gy and material culture but was to be rooted in native resources. Robert Bel- 
lah, as quoted by Van Bragt, puts it precisely: “ The Pacific War posed for 
Japan the profoundest problems of cultural identity—the relation of Eastern 
to Western culture and the relation of the Japanese past to the modern era.” 38 
The goal would be “ a productive transformation of modernity with global 
consequences.” 39
38 Rude Awakenings, 238.
39 Feenberg, ibid., 165.
40 “Kindai no chokoku” ron, 265. The same point was stressed by Ioki Makoto in 
an article on the Kyoto school, Asahi Shinbun, August 17, 1995. This was in response 
to an article by Tsutsui Kiyotada in the same newspaper the previous day which dis­
cusses the postwar intellectuals who sought a scapegoat for Japanese imperialism and 
found the perfect target in the Kyoto school philosophers because of their prominence.
41 Ibid., 272. For details regarding Nishitani’s views, see Mori Tetsuro’s study, 
“ Nishitani Keiji and the Question of Nationalism,” Rude Awakenings, especially 318.
Karatani Kojin in the Afterword to the 1989 reprint of Hiromatsu’s “Kin- 
dai no chokoku” ron notes that the problems discussed were molded in the de­
cades since the Meiji Restoration and serious reflections began as early as the 
mid-1930s.40 Thus, he states that the symposium expressed a long concern and 
should not be regarded as simply a wartime propaganda. In fact, the very op­
posite was true in 1942: the participants were regarded as dangerous threats to 
national polity. Karatani believes that the discussions are still significant 
today, requiring our attention and reflection, for two reasons: we are in the 
midst of the modernity to be overcome, and we have yet to find a viable 
philosophy which would make the overcoming possible.
The basic problematic of modernity, summed up by Nishitani, is the frag­
mentation and compartmentalization of life, originating with the fission creat­
ed in Western civilization by the Reformation, Renaissance, and scientific cul­
ture.41 The adverse effects of Western influence on Japan had to be overcome 
by drawing on the native tradition, for the historical resources of the West 
were unavailable to them. Unless this direction was taken, argued Kobayashi 
Hideo, a major representative of the romantic school at the symposium, 
Japan would be a mere replica of the West without any strong foundation.
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Related to this overcoming was the role and direction that Japan might play 
in world history. In the euphoria of the early victories of the Japanese Imperi­
al Army in the Pacific War, some of the participants expressed ultranationalis- 
tic and racist views, consciously or unconsciously, but the implications of the 
symposium are still worthy of consideration today. Commenting on the long 
shadow Nishida cast on the symposium, Tosaka Jun once remarked that “ the 
philosophy of Nishida, along with Bergson and Husserl, could contribute to 
overcoming the impasse of civilization.” 42 Hiromatsu also suggests that 
Nishida’s logic of place, as well as Tanabe’s logic of species, may be relevant 
today as it was during the war years in addressing this issue.43
42 Quoted in “Kindai no chokoku” ron, 30.
43 Ibid., 271.
44 “ The Problem of World Culture: Towards an Appropriation of Nishida’s 
Philosophy of Nation and Culture,” The Eastern Buddhist, N.S. 28:2 (Autumn, 1995), 
184. It responds to the problems discussed by Arthur Schlesinger, The Disuniting o f 
America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).
45 Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f the World Order 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). See also his article in Foreign Affairs (Summer 
1993) in which he sums up his thesis, 22: “ It is my hypothesis that the fundamental 
source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily eco­
nomic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominant source of conflict will 
be cultural.”
46 See his “Tanabe’s Logic of the Specific and the Critique of the Global Village,” 
The Eastern Buddhist, op. cit., 199. Heisig ranks Tanabe, as well as Nishida and 
Nishitani, with “ Russell, Jaspers, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Ortega y 
Gassett, James, Whitehead, Croce, Aurobindo and the like.”
John Maraldo moves in this direction in an article published subsequent to 
Rude Awakenings. He believes that Nishida’s logic of place may possibly con­
tribute to dealing with the “ current problems of multiculturalism, multination­
al relations, the Eurocentrism of philosophy, and the construction of Asia as 
the Other.” 44 He does this by carefully appropriating those aspects which are 
free of outdated Japanism and related ideological baggage. While Maraldo’s 
essay, focusing on multiculturalism, is an interesting exercise, we would wel­
come a similar application to the recent work by Samuel Huntington on the 
clash of civilizations.45
In a similar move James Heisig attempts to apply Tanabe’s logic of species 
to the contemporary scene, taking his own suggestion that the “ Kyoto-school 
philosophy needs to be liberated from the confines of the culture and language 
that gave it birth in order to execute its full potential.” 46 He thus seeks to 
retrieve something positive from the ambiguities of wartime philosophizing. 
Concluding his study of Tanabe, Heisig states:
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Tanabe’s political conclusions are in no sense a natural outflow of 
the logic of specific; they are a refusal of its author to take the idea as 
seriously as it deserves.47
47 Rude Awakenings, 288.
48 The Eastern Buddhist, 28:2 (Autumn 1995), 198-224.
49 The Journal o f Asian Studies, 54:3 (August 1995), 759.
50 Nishitani, Nishida Kitaro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 161— 
191.
51 Feenberg notes that Nishitani’s sunyata is a Buddhist commentary on Nishida’s 
absolute nothingness, Rude Awakenings, 163 fn.
In a subsequent work contained in The Eastern Buddhist Heisig undertakes 
the complex task of analyzing and elaborating on the logic of species, 
clarifying its origins and its application to the events of his times.48 In the end 
Tanabe failed, yet his logic of species still merits attention and study.
That the central issues taken up by the Kyoto school philosophers have 
relevance today is evident in the keynote address delivered by Ying-Shih Yu of 
Princeton, president of the Association of Historians of Asia, in their 1991 
conference. Summarizing his lecture, Tessa Morris-Suzuki reports as follows:
For too long, he suggested, historians have looked to the past 
through a narrow window shaped by the values of the west, and par­
ticularly by the all-powerful western notion of history as the pursuit 
of “ scientific truth.” To break through this constricting frame we 
need to recognize “ that the history of every society or people 
deserves to be studied not only as a part of world history but also on 
account of its inherent value.” 49
This is one of the central points that is addressed by Nishida, Tanabe, and 
Nishitani, however different on the surface their philosophies may appear. Let 
us examine its possible application to the contemporary scene.
Nishitani does not find any essential difference between Nishida’s logic of 
place and Tanabe’s logic of species, both being expressions of absolute 
nothingness.50 Likewise, I believe that Nishitani Keiji’s philosophy, as found 
in Religion and Nothingness, shares the same fundamental thought.51 This 
work is based on a threefold analysis of reality as the field of sensation and rea­
son, the field of nihility, and the field of emptiness (sunyata). The field of emp­
tiness is explained metaphorically by Nishitani:
Since there is no circumference on the field of sunyata, “ all is One” 
cannot be symbolized by a circle (or a sphere) . . .  It is, as it were, a 
circumferenceless center, a center that is only center and nothing
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else, a center on the field of emptiness. That is to say, on the field of 
sunyata the center is everywhere 52
52 Religion and Nothingness (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 146.
53 G. R. Evans, Alan o f  Lille: The Frontiers o f  Theology in the Later Twelfth Centu­
ry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 73. I am indebted to my colleague, 
Carol Zaleski, for this source.
54 C. W. Huntington, Jr., The Emptiness o f  Emptiness (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai‘i, 1989).
55 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 190.
56 William James, Essays in Pragmatism (New York: Hafner, 1955), 161.
This reminds us of a favorite imagery in medieval Christianity: “ circle whose 
circumference is nowhere, and whose center is everywhere.” One of its earliest 
formulation is found in Alan of Lille in the early 13th century. In his words,
The circumference is the immensity of God himself, and because he 
is not circumscribed by place, the circumference is “ said to be no­
where.” And so God is the intelligible sphere whose centre is every­
where and whose circumference is nowhere.53
The circumferenceless circle is a metaphor for the boundless world which 
affirms multiplicity. In traditional Buddhist language in contrast to the world 
of duality which has only a single ego-center and always stands in an adversari­
al relation to the other, the boundless world contains infinite centers, each con­
tributing to the whole. The world of nonduality affirms multiplicity.
Here emptiness empties itself,54 and God is the “ God beyond the God of the­
ism.” 55 Nonduality goes beyond the outdated constructs of East and West, 
nothingness and being, Buddhism and Christianity. What remains is the con­
crete historical world in which a new vision of life awaits to be realized 
through the efforts of responsible individuals. How that is to be achieved has 
no simple answer, but the pragmatic approach advocated by William James 
may be helpful. While it may not answer our deepest spiritual needs, it helps 
us dispense with pseudo-problems that hinder it:
The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth 
happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity 
is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying it­
self, its veh-fication. Its validity is the process of valid-tffzow.56
This is not ideology translating into fact, but philosophy becoming embodied 
in a person. In this process of self-cultivation one does not rely on an external 
guide but assumes total responsibility to insure that “ truth happens to an
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idea.” This is what is meant by walking the path that is Tao or walking the 
middle way (madhyama-pratipad) as a personal challenge.
IV
Among the papers under the topic of Zen, Christopher Ives’ contribution is 
important because he introduces the works of Ichikawa Hakugen, who was a 
rare voice in modern Japanese Buddhism. I would urge him to pursue his 
research on the subject, so that he might answer his own basic question: “ the 
linkage between theory and practice, between philosophical systems and com­
plex political activities.” 57 In order to proceed some inevitable questions re­
quire answers.
According to Ives, Ichikawa was connected with Hanazono University, 
affiliated with Rinzai Zen, throughout his lifetime, beginning in 1921 as a stu­
dent and until 1973 when he retired from the faculty. This covers the entire 
spectrum of Japan’s military aggression on the Asian continent, followed by 
defeat and devastation and subsequent economic recovery. The question of 
time frame becomes a primary issue.
When exactly did Ichikawa find himself “ increasingly against the war and 
the rhetoric of kokutai” '! it during the war years? If so, did he act on it, if 
at all? Or was the protest simply a postwar phenomenon, an ex post facto  criti­
cism, as Hirata Seiko asserts? Did his criticism evoke any kind of response, 
either individually or collectively?
We would especially like to know whether Ichikawa’s criticisms had any 
real impact on institutional Zen. How did he confront the Zen establishment 
about its complicity in the war of aggression? Did the Rinzai Zen institution 
respond to the criticisms in any way? Did Ichikawa himself develop a social 
ethic to avoid the errors of other Zen practitioners? Did he remain on the 
faculty of Hanazono University while engaged in his criticisms? Did his cri­
tique of Nishida include his close friend, D. T. Suzuki?
These questions are raised also in relation to Ichikawa’s wholesale criticism 
of Japanese Buddhism, many of them well known but never put so comprehen­
sively in a single paragraph. According to Ives,
[Ichikawa] also attributed the wartime stumbling of Japanese to such 
factors as the historical interdependency between Japanese Bud­
dhism and those in political power (the “ state” ); passive interpreta­
tions of the doctrine of karma; the lack of notions of justice and hu­
man rights in Buddhism, partially owing to the doctrine of no-self; 
the philosophy of debt; Japanese views of the “ home” at the level of
57 Rude Awakenings, 319.
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family and nation and their connection to ancestor worship; and the 
spirituality of aging and tranquillity, which contributes to uncritical 
passivity in the social arena.58
58 Ibid., 29. For a fuller discussion, see Ives’ Zen Awakening and Society 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1992), 92-94.
59 Ibid., 155-156. See also Sharf, “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism,” in Curators 
o f the Buddha, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
124-125.
I myself have the same criticism and agree completely with Ichikawa, but the 
question remains: what did he do with it both on a personal and collective lev­
el, both Hanazono University and institutional Zen?
Robert Sharf also makes a important point by insisting that “ emptiness” is 
inseparable from “ form” —codified behavior, daily routine, and ritual proce­
dures. It underscores the emphasis on religious praxis and somatic involve­
ment in the Asian tradition. This should help young Westerners who travel to 
East Asia searching for enlightenment to realize that it doesn’t exist apart 
from the prescribed cycle of monastic life. Too many people who go are disap­
pointed in not getting “ it,” as if the fault is with Zen teachers and monas­
teries.
At the same time, however, I don’t think that Sharf intends to equate 
religious praxis with mindless routine. Otherwise, Buddhism would exclude 
those people who seek some meaningful answers to the problems of living and 
dying. In fact, I would suggest that it is the small percentage of monks and 
nuns and lay practitioners who, having tapped the spirituality in Zen, main­
tain the vitality of the tradition. So, the question comes down to this: What is 
the relationship of spiritual awakening and formalized ritual? The answer 
may depend on how Sharf defines “ experience.” This is a loaded term with 
multiple connotations and needs explication. The different meanings of ex­
perience in empiricism, romanticism, and Haiku are briefly mentioned in Feen- 
berg’s article,59 but its connotation in the long history of Buddhism may be 
even more complex and far reaching.
The same care in definition must also be given to “ silence.” Referring to the 
Vimalaklrti-nirdesa-sutra, Sharf makes no distinction between the silence of 
Sariptura and that of Vimalakirti, except to say that it’s “ a matter of creden­
tials.” This is akin to talking about deep faith commitment as simply a matter 
of “ religious preference,” no more and no less. But if we apply the twofold 
truth to the problem of linguistic usage, the silence of Sariptura is clearly 
within prapafica, showing perplexity in the realm of word-play, while the si­
lence of Vimalakirti clears away all conceptualizations (yijfiapti) for desana,
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words that lead to liberation and freedom. Discursive strategy alone cannot 
cover the full scope and depth of human life.
I also find problems with Sharf’s attachment to credentials, institutional 
sanctions, and traditional authority. While I agree that tradition is central to 
Zen, or any faith community for that matter, renewal and revitalization of a 
given tradition can come from both inside and outside of institutionally sanc­
tioned groups. This is especially true in the transmission of tradition from 
one culture to another.
I remember talking to a Japanese Christian some years ago. He lamented 
the fact that Christianity had not spread more widely in Japan, and said that 
as long as they relied on foreign money and missionaries, Christianity would 
never take roots in Japan. In contrast, the tremendous influence of Uchimura 
Kanzo and his lineage of Mukyokai (Non-church) movement, including such 
influential Christian intellectuals as Nambara Shigeru, Yanaihara Tadao, and 
others, had no official sanctions or institutional connections. They were out­
spoken critics of the war, when the officially sanctioned United Church of 
Christ in Japan, as well as almost all the Buddhist sects, were voicing unani­
mous support of the war effort. Proclamations repenting this shameful past of 
the Church, both Protestant and Catholic, appeared in Japanese newspapers 
at the time of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War.60
60 See Asahi Shinbun, June 16, 1995.
61 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and 
the Holocaust (New York: Random House, 1996).
62 Rude Awakenings, 52-65. Silence as a form of rebuke is traditional in East Asia.
We also find a similar situation in Germany in World War II, when the offi­
cial stand of the Church supported the government policy against the Jews.61 
Those few who helped the Jewish people escape persecutions were solitary 
figures outside of any kind of establishment Church—Raoul Wallenberg, Os­
kar Schindler, Chiune Sugihara, and other nameless individuals.
Several writers have accused D. T. Suzuki of nationalism, along with his 
lifelong friend Nishida. But he does not fit the ordinary definition of that 
term. He was born in the same year as Nishida, 1870, but his writings are de­
void of nationalistic vocabulary extolling the emperor, the kokutai, or the 
war. As Kirita Kiyohide has amply documented, even during the war years 
when Japanese journalism was filled with jingoistic and militaristic jargon, 
Suzuki continued to be prolific but maintained a neutral stance, choosing to 
write only about religious matters.62 This may be the reason that Ichikawa 
Hakugen’s essay on Suzuki mentions only episodes that reveal the latter’s
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unique and open personality, and no reference is made to any wartime com­
plicity.63
Soon after returning from the U.S., Suzuki taught for 12 years at 
Gakushuin, which enrolled only students from the imperial household, the 
aristocracy and the upper class in order to inculcate loyalty to the emperor. 
The faculty wore military-style uniforms, and greeted each other with hand sa­
lutes. The school was headed by army generals, such as Nogi Maresuke, who 
on the death of Emperor Meiji in 1912, committed double suicide with his 
wife to demonstrate his loyalty.
Former students recount Suzuki’s critical stance towards the school and 
expressions of patriotism.64 Once when General Nogi visited his class, the 
students were engaged in a five-minute meditation. Suzuki did not make his 
students stand to greet him, as was the custom. In the school publication, 
Hojinkai zasshi, he wrote articles in praise of individuality, predicted dissolu­
tion of the peerage, discussed poverty and other social issues which had noth­
ing to do with the privileged classes.65 If Suzuki had any inclination to be a 
nationalist, Gakushuin would have been ideal for his career. But in 1912 he 
resigned due to a “ collision” with Nogi’s successor, another army general. It 
was just at that time that he was invited to Otani University, a little known sec­
tarian institution.66
Another former student, Hidaka Daishiro, who was Dean of Students at 
Kyoto University, invited Suzuki for a lecture on Zen at the university in Sep­
tember, 1941, about the time the Imperial Army was invading French Indo­
China. In the course of his talk Suzuki deviated from his topic and shocked 
the audience by warning dire consequences if the Japanese did not learn the
63 See Ichikawa’s reminiscence in Suzuki Daisetsu: Hito to shiso [Suzuki: The per­
son and his thought] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1971), 128-132.
64 Koyama Naohiko, a student at Gakushuin, in Suzuki Daisetsu: Hito to shiso, 
406-411. See also the account by another student, Matsukata Saburo, who notes a 
framed calligraphy in the Suzuki home during the Gakushuin period which read, “ The 
world is my country; to do good is my religion,” in Suzuki Daisetsu: Hito to gakumon 
[Suzuki: The person and his scholarship] (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1962), 63-74. The actual 
saying, according to informed sources, was “The world is my home; to do good is my 
religion.”
65 For examples of Suzuki’s social consciousness, see Kirita, “Young D. T. Suzuki’s 
View on Society,” The Eastern Buddhist 29:1 (Spring 1996), 109-133.
66 From his autobiography contained in A Zen Life: D. T. Suzuki Remembered, ed. 
Masao Abe (New York: Weatherhill, 1986), 21. In the Japanese version Suzuki also 
mentions the criticism directed against his wife, because she was American. Suzuki 
Daisetsu Zenshu (sdz) [Collected Works of Suzuki Daisetsu] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1970), 
30: 612.
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true nature of America’s industrial might.67 He also confided in a friend at 
that time, saying that Japan would lose the war, that the government was bar­
baric, and that the nationalistic education of the young was completely mis­
guided.
67 See Akizuki Ryomin, Suzuki Zengaku to Nishida tetsugaku [Suzuki’s Zen 
thought and Nishida philosophyl (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1971), 284.
68 His criticism results in the work, Japanese Spirituality (1944), tr. Norman Wad­
dell (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1972).
69 SDZ 17:169-182.
70 SDZ Bekkan 1:289, 289, 445, and 456.
71 See, for example, Merton, Zen and the Birds o f  Appetite (New York: New Direc­
tions, 1968), 59-66.
72 Suzuki, Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist (New York: Harper and Brothers,
Suzuki began writing on Japanese spirituality during the Pacific War, be­
cause he wanted to distinguish seishin (Japanese spirit) from reisei (spiritua­
lity).68 In brief, he wrote that if spirit meant volitional will, there is no differ­
ence, whether Japanese, Chinese, or Jew. And if it connoted some kind of 
ideal, it is not inherent in a people but is something to be realized in praxis. 
This was an indirect criticism of ultranationalism in accord with the tradition­
al method of expressing opposition to accepted views.
Suzuki, however, openly made negative comments over the years on contem­
porary Japanese society. He, for example, takes to task various facets of 
modern Japanese life: child rearing, family system, Buddhist clergy, unkempt 
kitchen, bathroom, and sewage system, unprofessional proofreading, destruc­
tion of landscape, etc.69 A cursory look at the articles he wrote over several de­
cades for Chtigai nippo, the religious newspaper, also reveals his criticism of 
Buddhism on a variety of topics: future of organized Buddhism, the ideal 
priest for reviving the tradition, freedom and the Buddhist ideal, proposals to 
invigorate Buddhism, and so on.70 These were written for the Japanese audience 
and are not found in his English works. A thorough study of the approximate­
ly 100 volumes written in his native language is necessary to evaluate Suzuki’s 
work properly.
The same can be said of his sometimes simplistic view of Christianity found 
in his English writings. His Japanese works include sympathetic description of 
Christian faith experience and encourage people to read St. Francis of Assisi, 
Meister Eckhart, Jacques Maritain, and other Christian writers. Very few 
Japanese in the early 20th century probed into Christian spirituality to the ex­
tent that Suzuki did, a fact which was appreciated by people such as Thomas 
Merton.71 In fact, what Christian theologian showed any interest in a leading 
Buddhist thinker half a century ago, when Suzuki was writing sympathetically 
about Meister Eckhart?72 Suzuki’s appreciation for Christian religiosity is the
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starting point of his little known work, Shin Buddhism.13 This is one of the 
sources of a recent, remarkable study, Understanding Shinran, by Hee-Sung 
Keel, a Korean Christian theologian, who teaches comparative religion at 
Sogang University.* 734 75
1957)
73 A revised edition of this book will be published by Shambhala Press under a new 
title, Buddha o f  Infinite Light.
74 Keel, Understanding Shinran (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1996).
75 The Bodhicaryavatara, tr. Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton (Oxford: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1996), 99.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Self-critique in academic discourse may not be fashionable, but it is an ethical 
challenge that is rooted in the Buddhist life: to live in the mode of another. As 
expressed in the Bodhicaryavatara: “ Whoever longs to rescue quickly himself 
and others should practice the supreme mystery: exchange of self and other.” 
75 This has been codified in the saying “ritashinjitsu.” Truth (shinjitsu) is real­
ized by benefiting others (rita) by becoming the other. As I conclude my com­
ments, three vignettes emerged, raising questions as to whether I myself have 
come even close to that ethical ideal.
In 1988 a distinguished Japanese Buddhist scholar of international repute 
came to Smith for a visit to give a lecture. We were just at that time organizing 
the “ Free Tibet” movement into an official body called the Pioneer Valley 
Friends of Tibet. I had just been elected its first president, so I explained our 
goals and activities. They included consciousness raising concerning the Ti­
betan situation; writing letters to congressmen about the Chinese invasion of 
Tibet, resulting in the destruction of 7,000 temples and the death of more than 
a million Tibetans; raising funds in preparation of receiving Tibetan refugees 
in our area of Western Massachusetts. The visitor was surprised to hear all this 
and simply said, “ We could never do that in Japan.”
Although he himself was a ordained Buddhist priest, relied extensively on 
Tibetan Buddhist texts, and knew well the plight of his fellow Buddhists in 
Tibet, he would not do anything to go against the political and commercial in­
terests of the Japanese Government. When I heard his curt reply, I felt that 
Japan as an insular society had not really changed over the years, in spite of it 
being known as a democracy. If Japanese society has changed since the war 
years, it is only on the surface and not at its depth, the depth alluded to by 
Endo Shusaku as “mudswamp,” Robert Bellah as “ submerged transcen­
dence,” and Maruyama Masao as basso ostinato.
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In 1968, soon after receiving a one-year visiting appointment to teach at the 
University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, I was one of a dozen or so facul­
ty to sign a strong letter protesting the U.S involvement in Vietnam. This letter 
appeared in the college daily, so a few days later a group of students and facul­
ty came to my office and urged me to lead a march, protesting the war. A pro­
test march lead by an Asian American would attract the photojournalists, and 
we would make front page news. I balked at their request, for I had just per­
sonally witnessed the police violence in Chicago during the Democratic con­
vention that summer.
If I were to be arrested and jailed, what would happen to my wife and eight 
year-old son, who had just joined me in an unfamiliar city? In a democracy 
like America we are free to criticize social injustice; in a land of immigrants we 
can easily lead a Free Tibet movement. But when it comes down to our own 
life and safety, it is another matter. I wondered about the plight of Nishida 
during the war years when he was under surveillance of the Special Higher 
Police and friends acted to protect him from being arrested.76
76 See Nakamura’s work cited in fn. 33; also mentioned in articles by Ueda, Yusa, 
and others in Rude Awakenings.
77 Gates o f the Forest (New York: Avon Books, 1966), 168.
In August 1992 my wife and I undertook a two-week tour of Europe with a 
group of friends, starting from Munich, Germany. On our first day we visited 
the Dachau Concentration Camp. I had just read that the first liberators of a 
Dachau subcamp were Japanese American soldiers of the 552nd Field Ar­
tillery Battalion, 442nd Regimental Combat Team, but that news had been 
suppressed by the U.S. Government for almost 50 years because in 1944 the 
families of many of these soldiers were incarcerated behind barbed wire fences 
in the most desolate areas of the United States.
But once I saw the death camp, the barracks, gas ovens, and the sanitized 
museum of Dachau, I forgot about that ironic event, and my thoughts turned 
to the tragedy of the Jewish people that culminated in the Holocaust. After 
that I was no longer interested in sightseeing. Instead, wherever we went I 
traced the persecutions of the Jews, prelude to their genocide, in Salzburg, 
Vienna, Budapest, Warsaw, Cracow, Gdansk, Auschwitz, Prague, and Am­
sterdam. And wherever I went, I asked myself: if I had been a college profes­
sor in Germany and knowing about the Holocaust, would I have spoken out? 
What protest action would I have taken? What role would have I played in 
this horrendous and unspeakable tragedy?
Any simplistic answer would be a lie. Yet one must respond to the haunting 
words of Elie Wiesel in The Gates o f  the Forest: “ He who is not with the vic­
tims is with the executioners.” 77
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